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INTRODUCTION
In July 2009, the Obama Administration proposed legislation that
would create a Consumer Financial Protection Agency (“CFPA”). Among
other items, the proposed legislation would eliminate federal preemption of
state consumer protection laws, which would encourage states to
reintroduce a scattering of local rules and regulations. Federal rules
promulgated by the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Agency
would override “weaker” state laws, but the states would be free to adopt
“stricter” laws. The National Bank Act (“NBA”) and the Home Owners’
Loan Act (“HOLA”) would be amended to apply state consumer protection
laws to national banks and federally chartered savings institutions. In
addition, the NBA and HOLA would be amended to provide that their
respective “visitorial” provisions would not prevent a state Attorney
General’s enforcement of federal or state law.
The legislation is an outgrowth of a recent—though largely noneconomic—literature linking preemption to much of what ails the U.S.
banking industry, including the subprime mortgage crisis. In Part I of this
report, we briefly review the preemption debate, beginning with the
passage of the National Bank Act of 1864. A review of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in preemption cases reveals that the Court has, based on
statute and legal precedent, both implicitly and explicitly promoted
economic efficiency through preemption. Through such rulings, the Court
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reduced local state efforts to erect barriers to competition, the denial of
which increased consumer welfare and economic efficiency.
Next, we review the economic case for and against preemption. When
preemption is considered from an economic efficiency standpoint, its
merits become apparent. We review the literature supporting the OCC’s
regulatory policy. We also provide data showing that the overwhelming
majority of subprime mortgage loans were originated by companies that
were not subject to preemption, further undermining the argument that
preemption is to blame for the subprime crisis. Our findings are
corroborated by a recent white paper issued by the Treasury, noting that
94% of “high-priced loans” to “lower income borrowers” were originated
by lenders not covered by the Community Reinvestment Act. Finally, we
review the arguments put forward by critics of preemption. The arguments
against preemption are generally characterized by a failure to consider the
economic benefits of preemption and a lack of empirical validation.
In Part II, we analyze the economic benefits of preemption using
examples from actual OCC interventions, academic studies, and case
studies from industries with similar regulatory situations. We identify four
specific economic benefits of preemption. First, preemption eliminates
state-sponsored protectionism. We review the OCC’s record of intervening
to ensure that states do not protect local industries from out-of-state banks
at the expense of consumers. For example, in 1993, the OCC issued an
interpretive letter finding that a Connecticut law prohibiting national banks
from selling annuities in Connecticut was preempted by the National Bank
Act; in 1996, the OCC issued an interpretive letter concluding that a Texas
state law restricting national banks’ ability to sell annuities in the state was
preempted by the National Bank Act; and in 2001, the OCC issued an
interpretive letter finding that a Florida law prohibiting out-of-state banks
from operating ATMs in the state was inconsistent with the National Bank
Act and therefore preempted. Each of these actions facilitated increased
price competition and increased availability of financial services for local
consumers, despite efforts by entrenched local political interests to avoid
increased competition.
Second, preemption increases the availability of credit while reducing
its price. Preemption limits the ability of states to impose price controls.
Price controls ultimately decrease the level and quality of banking services
to consumers, increase prices, and inhibit economic growth. For example,
in 2002, municipal ordinances in San Francisco and Santa Monica that
prohibited banks from charging ATM fees to non-depositors were held to
be preempted by the courts. This action increased consumer choice and
decreased the price for ATM services. Preemption also removes obstacles
to the creation of national credit markets.
Third, preemption creates a uniform regulatory climate for banks
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operating across state lines, allowing them to operate more efficiently. A
review of the economic literature on state regulation of banks reveals that
reducing barriers to bank services across state lines increases economic
efficiency and social welfare.
A centralized regulatory regime is especially important in industries
that are characterized by economies of scale, such as banking. In Part III,
we present two case studies illustrating the benefits of imposing uniform
regulatory standards in other U.S. industries: the wine industry and
wireless telephony. Several states erected barriers to out-of-state wineries
directly shipping their goods ordered online or over the phone to consumers
without similar restrictions for in-state wineries; these barriers were
overturned by the Supreme Court in 2005, creating what economists call a
“natural experiment” designed to test the consumer-welfare effects of the
state regulations. Economic research reveals that, soon after states’
discriminatory regulations were repealed, wine prices at brick-and-mortar
stores declined up to 40% relative to prices offered by online retailers. A
similar episode occurred in the U.S. wireless industry. Before 1994, states
and the federal government had concurrent power to regulate wireless
services; in 1994, the Federal Communications Commission preempted the
state laws regulating wireless telephony. Once again, economic research
demonstrated that the change in regulatory oversight toward uniform,
national standards increased economic efficiency. Before deregulation,
consumers in states that regulated wireless telephony, such as California
and New York, paid more. Furthermore, state regulations discouraged
wireless providers from entering the market and slowed consumer adoption
of cellular phones. Just as balkanized state laws hindered the growth of
wireless networks and raised cellular prices for everyone, balkanized state
branching laws inhibited the growth of ATM networks and bank branches,
raising the cost of credit and banking services for consumers.
In Part IV, we offer two concrete policy implications that flow from
our empirical findings. First, elimination of preemption would jeopardize
the significant economic benefits created by a uniform regulatory
environment. A careful review of the evidence indicates that preemption
has been an important policy tool for opening up markets and increasing
competition, benefiting both banks and their customers.
Without
preemption, there would be no federal check on state regulators and
legislatures who may be swayed by local business or political interests and
costly local protectionist measures would proliferate. Second, with
preemption, policymakers can focus on creating new unified rules to better
serve consumers and prevent the problems that led to the recent crisis from
repeating themselves in the future. Preemption was not responsible for the
consumer-protection failures associated with predatory lending and the
subprime crisis and preemption does not preclude the Federal government
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from taking action to avoid repetition of the crisis. The gaps in regulation
identified in the recent crisis can be plugged with more stringent federal
rules that preserve a uniform (and rigorous) regulatory environment.
I.

THE PREEMPTION DEBATE

The dual banking system of the United States divides the regulation of
banks between the states and the federal government. Prior to the passage
of the National Currency Act of 1863, private banks were exclusively statechartered. But since the 1860s, banks have had the option of choosing
whether to be state-chartered or nationally chartered.1 Congress created
this system during the Civil War by the National Currency Act, which was
subsequently modified and reenacted as the National Bank Act of 1864
(“NBA”).2
Under the NBA, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”), a bureau within the Treasury Department, has the authority to
charter and supervise all national banks.3 In addition, the NBA vests broad
rulemaking authority in the OCC.4 An important issue throughout the
history of the OCC has been the interplay between federal and state law
with respect to the regulation and supervision of national banks.
This section briefly reviews the treatment of preemption by the
judiciary. A review of the Supreme Court’s decisions in preemption cases
reveals that the Court has, based on statute and legal precedent, both
implicitly and explicitly promoted economic efficiency through
preemption. Through these rulings, the Court reduced state regulators’
ability to manipulate the banking industry, and thereby increased the
economic efficiency of the nation overall.
A.

The roots of preemption of state laws in the banking industry

The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have determined that
the National Bank Act and the associated regulations of the OCC preempt
state laws. Federally chartered savings associations are also considered
federal instrumentalities, and the congressional enactment authorizing the
establishment of these institutions also has preemptive effect.

1. Hal. S. Scott, What is the Proper Role of the States in Financial Regulation? in
FEDERALISM AND FINANCIAL REGULATION IN FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS,
NATIONAL INTERESTS 139 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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National banks

The roots of the preemption doctrine may be found in the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which states that the Constitution and laws
of the United States are the “Supreme Law” of the land, notwithstanding
anything in the Constitution or laws of the States to the contrary.5 This
clause was the basis for the landmark 1819 Supreme Court decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland, establishing the principle that state law cannot
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal legislative goals, in
that case by a state’s attempt to tax the Bank of the United States.6
Over the years since that decision, the Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have frequently determined that the National Bank Act and
the implementing regulations of the OCC preempt state laws. For example,
in 1874, just a few years after Congress adopted the National Bank Act, in
Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, the Supreme Court stated,
National banks have been national favorites. They were
established for the purpose, in part, of providing a currency for
the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of
the General government. It could not have been intended,
therefore, to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation
by the States, or to ruinous competition with State banks.7
More recent cases have affirmed the preemptive effect of the National
Bank Act and OCC regulations. In Franklin National Bank v. New York,
the Supreme Court held that a state could not prohibit a national bank from
using the word “savings” in its advertising, since the state law conflicts
with the power of national banks to accept savings deposits.8 In Marquette
National Bank v. First of Omaha Corporation, the Supreme Court held that
under the National Bank Act, a national bank may charge a rate of interest
permitted in the bank’s home state, even if the loan is made through the use
of a credit card to a customer residing in a different state with a lower usury
limit.9 In Barnett Bank v. Nelson, the Supreme Court summarized the
preemption doctrine, explaining that a state law cannot “stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment” of the purposes of a federal law, such as
the National Bank Act.10 The Court also held that Congress would not
want a state to “forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power
that Congress has explicitly granted.”11 On the other hand, the Court stated
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1874).
Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378-9 (1954).
Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 301 (1978).
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
Id. at 33.
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that the states have the power to adopt laws that do not “significantly
interfere” with national bank powers.12 More recent Supreme Court cases
have continued to follow these precedents with respect to substantive state
requirements.13 However, in 2009, the Court held that the National Bank
Act does not preclude the ability of a state attorney general to bring an
action in court to enforce applicable state or federal law against a national
bank or its subsidiary.14
2.

Federal savings associations

Federally chartered savings associations are also considered federal
instrumentalities, and the congressional enactment authorizing the
establishment of these institutions has preemptive effect. In 1982, in the
case of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association v. De la Cuesta, the
Supreme Court held that both the statute and the implementing regulations
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the predecessor agency to the
Office of Thrift Supervision) preempt conflicting state laws.15 Specifically,
the Court held that Board's due-on-sale regulation preempted conflicting
state limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federal savings and loan
associations.16
A due-on-sale clause is a common provision in a mortgage contract
that gives the lender the right to declare the entire mortgage loan due and
payable upon the sale of the home. In the early 1980s, when interest rates
soared to extremely high levels, it became difficult to sell a home without a
sharp discount in the sales price, merely because of the cost of financing
the home with a new loan.17 California courts at that time ruled that the
economic situation made due-on-sale clauses unreasonable under
California law, and therefore void, provided the creditworthiness of the
new owner was acceptable to the lender.18 However, while these actions
helped the current homeowner sell his or her home for a higher price, it
also added significant losses for the savings association lender, since the
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia, 550 U.S. 1, 7 (2007) (holding that national banks
and their operating subsidiaries are not required to register under state mortgage licensing
law).
14. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2722 (2009).
15. Fidelity Fed. Savings and Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Federal Housing Finance Association, Housing Prices Continue to Grow
at Healthy Rates, Figure 1: Real Gross Domestic Product and the OFHEO HPI Since 1975,
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/1066/Focus1Q02.pdf (showing that the real house
price index declined in the early 1980s)).
18. See, e.g., Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 582 P.2d 970, (Cal. 1978) (holding that
state chartered banks and savings and loan associations and other mortgage lenders were
forbidden from making mortgages due on sale).
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savings association had to pay market rates to fund the loan but was
receiving a below market rate as long as the mortgage was outstanding.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board recognized the safety and
soundness implications of the California decision and issued a regulation
preempting state laws (including judicial interpretations) that prevented
federal savings associations from exercising due-on-sale provisions in
existing mortgage contracts. In De la Cuesta, the Supreme Court affirmed
the preemptive effect of this regulation.
From a policy perspective, this case illustrates the potential risks
associated with imbalances between federal and state law. The lack of
federal law created what economists call a “moral hazard” problem—
namely, the federal government having to pay for the costs created by
California’s attempt at regulation; by creating a significant safety and
soundness risk to California savings associations, the state endangered the
federal insurance fund backing the deposits at these institutions. The
imposition of a uniform standard solved the moral hazard problem.
Furthermore, the story of De La Cuesta illustrates that preserving the safety
and soundness of banks, on the one hand, and protecting consumers on the
other are inseparable policy goals. Allowing banks to maximize their
opportunities to operate efficiently is necessary for insuring that consumers
have access to affordable credit.
B.

The case for and against preemption

When preemption is considered from an efficiency standpoint, its
merits become apparent. In a 2008 article in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Harvard Law Professor Elizabeth Warren, chair
of the Congressional Oversight Panel which argued in favor of ending
preemption, and her co-author Oren Bar-Gill, professor of New York
University School of Law, wrote:
The erosion of state power in itself need not be problematic from
a consumer protection perspective. In an era of interstate
banking, uniform regulation of consumer credit products at the
federal level may well be more efficient than a litany of
consumer protection rules that vary from state to state. The
problem is not in the federal preemption; it is in the failure of
federal law to offer a suitable alternative to the preempted state
law.19
As we discuss in-depth below, the charge that federal law has failed to
protect consumers is false. The overwhelming majority of instances of

19. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U PA. L. REV. 1, 83
(2008) (emphasis added).

MASONFINAL[1]

788

6/1/2010 10:45:46 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:3

predatory lending involved loans originated by institutions not subject to
preemption, but instead under the purview of state laws. However, it is
extremely salient that even an advocate of increased consumer protection
like Professor Warren concluded that preemption, in and of itself, is likely
justified in terms of the efficiencies it creates. A deeper examination of the
economics of preemption reveals that Professor Warren had it right in her
law review article: preemption has been a force for increasing the
efficiency of the banking sector.
Those conclusions are well established. Professor Phillip Strahan of
Boston College gave a presentation at the Chicago Fed’s 42nd Annual
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition in which he concluded that
“preemption of state laws continues the process of financial opening by
lowering [the] cost of interstate banking.”20 He also found that financial
openness benefits both banks and the economy as a whole.21 He averred
that the financial openness had helped banks to achieve economies of scale
and improve risk management, and had increased competition in the
banking sector.22 He documents a variety of benefits to consumers
associated with preemption, including higher quality service from ATMs
and bank branches, increased convenience, lower prices for loans, and
lower underwriting fees.23
Similarly, Dr. Gary Whalen, an economist at the OCC, examined the
consequences of preemption on national bank and state banks by
examining the OCC’s preemption of state anti-predatory lending statues,
beginning with the preemption of the Georgia Fair Lending Act
(“GLFA”).24 In 2003, a national bank asked the OCC to examine the
GLFA; the OCC found that the law would “otherwise affect national
banks’ real estate lending” and, accordingly, concluded that federal law
preempted GLFA.25 In 2004, the OCC promulgated a new set of rules
generally preempting state laws that regulate the credit terms offered by
banks.26 To a large extent, these rules codified prior court decisions, letters,
and regulations, including those issued by the OTS, putting them all in one

20. Philip E. Strahan, Financial Openness and Regulatory Competition, Presentation at
the Chicago Fed Bank Structure Conference (May 2006), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/news_and_conferences/conferences_and_events/files/2006_bsc_
strahan.pdf.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Gary Whalen, The Wealth Effects of Preemption Announcements by the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency After the Passage of the Georgia Fair Lending Act, OFFICE
OF
THE
COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY
(2005),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=869038.
25. Id. at 1.
26. Id.
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place.
To gauge the effect of preemption on national and state banks, Dr.
Whalen employed an event study to examine how the stocks of holding
companies associated with national banks and with state banks responded
to the various public announcements surrounding these preemption
decisions.27 Dr. Whalen’s event study focused on four events occurring
from 2003 to 2004 where the OCC made a significant announcement
concerning its intent to preempt state anti-predatory laws.28
Dr. Whalen reaches two salient conclusions. First, he finds that
“[t]aken as a whole, the findings suggest that state anti-predatory lending
laws like the GFLA impose a proportionately greater compliance burden on
smaller, multistate companies unable to realize economies of scale, which
is reduced by preemption.”29 Second, he finds no evidence that preemption
places state banks at a competitive disadvantage.30 Indeed, the results
indicate that smaller holding companies associated with state chartered
banks tended to show positive rather than negative excess returns around
the announcement events; they did not “differ significantly from national
bank companies with similar characteristics.”31 Thus, Dr. Whalen’s
empirical analysis suggests that the opponents of preemption have ignored
the compliance costs that ending preemption will impose on smaller,
national banks, while exaggerating its potential to harm state banks.
Julie Williams, First Senior Deputy Comptroller and Chief Counsel at
the OCC, and Michael Bylsma, Director of the Community and Consumer
Law Division at the OCC, described the OCC’s approach to anti-predatory
lending regulation in an article in the American Bar Association’s Business
Lawyer.32 The authors explain that in 2003, “the OCC issued the most
comprehensive supervisory standards to address predatory and abusive
lending practices ever published by a federal banking agency.”33 Rather
than attempting to ban specific loan or credit arrangements, the OCC’s
regulations forced banks to examine their own lending policies based on
the potential they create for abusive, illegal, or unsound lending practices.34
The OCC regulations covered a wide variety of subjects, including
underwriting policies, abusive lending practices, high-risk transactions,
loan flipping, and equity stripping.35 The OCC enforces its regulations
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 21.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 33-34.
32. Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, Federal Preemption and Federal Banking
Agency Responses to Predatory Lending, 59 BUS. LAW. 1193 (2004).
33. Id. at 1194.
34. Id. at 1195.
35. Id. at 1193-96.
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with a staff of approximately 1,700 examiners who evaluate national banks
and their subsidiaries.36 The authors explain that “[i]n addition to on-site
examinations of loan file reviews, OCC examiners look at bank policies
and procedures as part of the supervisory process.”37 The evidence
indicates that the OCC’s anti-predatory lending measures have been
effective. The authors aver “information available to the OCC from its
consumer complaint database and supervisory activities does not suggest a
general problem involving direct lending by national banks or their
operating subsidiaries.”38 Indeed, a group of State Attorneys General
recognized in an Amicus Brief submitted in National Home Equity
Mortgage Association v. OTS that banks and their subsidiaries subject to
OCC supervision were not responsible for predatory lending abuses:
Based on consumer complaints received, as well as investigations
and enforcement actions undertaken by the Attorneys General,
predatory lending abuses are largely confined to the subprime
mortgage lending market and to non-depository institutions.
Almost all of the leading subprime lenders are mortgage
companies and finance companies, not banks or direct bank
subsidiaries.39
Notwithstanding such findings, critics of preemption continue to push
three main arguments, including blaming federal regulation for the
subprime crisis, alleging that federal regulation has been lax, and that
preemption threatens the banking market’s stability.
First, consumer groups like the Consumer Federation of America and
Public Interest Research Groups have claimed that preemption is
responsible for the increase in lax and predatory lending associated with the
subprime crisis.40 In particular, they argue that preemption of state banking
laws allowed banks to originate predatory subprime and option-adjustablerate mortgages (“ARMs”). According to the OCC, national banks and their
operating subsidiaries originated only about 10% of the subprime loans
made in 2006, and only 12% to 14% of the non-prime loans originated in
the 2005-2007 period.41 The foreclosure rates for loans originated by
36. Id. at 1200.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1199.
39. Id. at n.29 (citing Brief for State Attorneys General as Amicus Curiae at 26, Nat'l
Home Equity Mortgage Ass'n v. OTS, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.D.C. 2003)).
40. Edmund Mierzwinski, Preemption of State Consumer Laws: Federal Interference
is a Market Failure, as reprinted in 6 GOV’T L. & POL’Y J. 6, 6-12 (2004); Allen Fishbein,
Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Groups Join to Persuade
Congress to Protect State Banking Regulations (Mar. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFApreemption.pdf.
41. Letter from John Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, to Elizabeth Warren, Chair,
Congressional
Oversight
Panel
(Feb.
14,
2009),
available
at
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national banks were substantially lower than those issued by state regulated
entities, indicating that these were higher quality and better underwritten
mortgages.42 Because the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) applies
only to banks, one can also examine the proportion of subprime loans made
by non-CRA lenders to test the robustness of our findings. A recent white
paper issued by the Treasury noted that 94% of “high-priced loans” to
“lower income borrowers” were originated by lenders not covered by the
CRA.43 Even proponents of increased financial regulation, such as the
Chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services, Barney Frank,
have acknowledged that the loans that prompted the subprime crisis were
“primarily being made outside the regular banking system.”44 Hence, it is
hard to find a credible link between federal preemption and the credit crisis.
Second, some opponents of preemption have asserted that preemption
is responsible for lax federal regulation of banking.45 Yet this argument is
also flawed because there is no necessary connection between preemption
and the level of regulatory oversight. Preemption is about uniform
regulation only. There is no reason why preemption and increased
oversight (relative to the current standards) cannot go hand in hand.
Indeed, the OCC is held in the industry to be one of the most stringent bank
regulatory agencies.
Third, some critics have attempted to argue that preemption threatens
the stability of the dual banking system.46 This argument is both
economically flawed and empirically inaccurate. From an economic
perspective, this argument essentially boils down to an assertion that we
should make national banks less efficient to prop up the dual-banking
system. However, rendering national banks less efficient would weaken
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/occ_copre sponse_021209.pdf.
42. Id.
43. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, at 69-70 (June 17,
2009) (“Moreover, the Federal Reserve has reported that only six percent of all the higherpriced loans were extended by the CRA-covered lenders to lower income borrowers or
neighborhoods in the local areas that are the focus of CRA evaluations.”).
44. Barney Frank, Chairman, H.R. Comm. on Fin. Serv., Speech before the National
Press Club: The “Loan Arrangers” Will Not Ride Again (Jul. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-barney-frank/the-loan-arrangers-will-n_b_247264.html.
45. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL ON REGULATORY REFORM, SPECIAL REPORT ON
REGULATORY REFORM, MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING
STABILITY, at 30-33 (Jan. 2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909report-regulatoryreform.pdf.
46. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC's Preemption Rules Exceed the
Agency's Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking System and Consumer
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 229 (2004) (arguing that “the OCC’s new
rules, unless overturned by Congress or the courts, will do great harm to the state banking
system, thereby threatening the viability of the dual banking system.”).
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the banking system as a whole. Furthermore, as Dr. Whalen’s research
made clear, there is no empirical basis for the claim that state banks are
harmed by preemption.
II.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PREEMPTION

Under the proposed financial services act, federal laws governing the
banking sector would as a regulatory “floor,” and states would be invited to
adopt stricter standards for anything that can be labeled “consumer
protection.” It is highly unlikely, however, that all states would respond in
the same way. Disparate standards would cause banks’ costs to rise and
dampen innovation in the banking industry. Moreover, because the
banking industry is competitive, increased costs would be largely passed
onto banks’ customers. In this section, we identify the economic benefits
of uniform bank regulations using examples from actual OCC interventions
and academic studies. We find that preemption generates three primary
benefits for banking customers: (1) it prevents states from imposing
protectionist measures, (2) it increases the availability and reduces the price
of credit, and (3) it creates a uniform regulatory climate for multi-state
banks, allowing them to operate more efficiently.
A. Preemption of protectionist measures
It is widely recognized as a matter of economics that the protection
of competitors rather than competition decreases economic welfare. In a
widely-used microeconomics textbook, Professor William Baumol of NYU
and Alan Blinder of Princeton quote the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Stamatakis Industries v. King, which emphasizes this distinction:
“[c]ompetition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving—and a
boon to society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of these
qualities that make it a bane to other producers.”47 Unfortunately,
disadvantaged competitors often seek and obtain protection from
competition under the guise of protecting consumers to the detriment of
consumers and society as a whole.
Economic textbooks are replete with examples of how protectionism
at the international level reduces consumer welfare. Protectionism within a
country is similarly harmful. UCLA economists Harold Cole and Lee
Ohanian examined the economic consequences of protecting certain
industries and groups of workers during the New Deal. The authors point
out that while falling productivity, a diminishing monetary base, and a
47. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 456 (The Dryden Press 7th ed. 1997) (citing Stamatakis Industries v. King, 965 F.
2d 469, 471 (1992)).
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chaotic banking system wreaked havoc on the economy between 1929 and
1933, these “negative shocks . . . [became] positive after 1933.”48 Hence,
the puzzle remains why, even after the turnaround, those factors failed to
precipitate a recovery. The authors conclude that about half of the
weakness of the recovery can be explained by New Deal policies that
allowed industries to collude or create monopolies—thus increasing the
prices of their products—in exchange for paying higher wages. The
policies protected inefficient incumbent firms and workers who kept their
jobs, but at high costs to would-be competitors, the ranks of the
unemployed, and consumers.
Given that protectionism has strong negative economic
consequences, it is essential to consider the National Bank Act and the
OCC’s role as the agency charged with implementing that Act in
facilitating competition among banks. The OCC has played an important
role in intervening to ensure that states do not protect local interests, like
insurance companies, from competition at the expense of consumers. For
example, in 1993, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that found that the
National Bank Act preempts a Connecticut law that prohibited national
banks from selling annuities in Connecticut.49 The OCC also reached a
similar conclusion with respect to a Connecticut requirement mandating
that national banks dealing in annuities obtain a license from the state.50 In
1996, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that also found that the National
Bank Act preempted a Texas state law that restricted national banks’ ability
to sell annuities in the state. Indeed, the OCC found that the law at issue
“effectively prohibit[ed] national banks from selling annuities as agents in
Texas.”51 In essence, these state initiatives, which one can reasonably infer
were adopted at the behest of local political interests to protect against
vigorous competition, created inefficiencies in the marketplace, denying
consumers the added choice and lower costs associated with more open
markets.
In 1997, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that concluded that the
National Bank Act preempted a Wisconsin law that precluded out-of-state
national banks from acting as a fiduciary in the state.52 The decision was
prompted by a merger between two trust bank subsidiaries of Bank One,

48. Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the
Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 781 (2004).
49. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #623 at 4,
(May 10, 1993).
50. Id.
51. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #748 at 1,
(Sept. 13, 1996).
52. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION #97-33 at
13, (Jun. 1, 1997).
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operating separately in Wisconsin and Ohio.53 Under Wisconsin’s state law
regarding trusts, Bank One would no longer have been able to act as a
fiduciary in Wisconsin after the merger.54 In 1998, the OCC issued an
interpretive letter that found that a Missouri law that precluded out-of-state
national banks from acting as a fiduciary in the state was inconsistent with
the National Bank Act, and therefore preempted.55 The decision was
prompted by a merger in which North Carolina-based NationsBank
subsumed its Missouri-based affiliate, Boatmen’s Trust Company.56
In 2001, the OCC issued an interpretive letter that found a conflict
between Federal law and a Massachusetts law that mandated that “an outof-state bank may establish an ATM only if the laws of the state in which it
has its main office would permit a bank with its main office in
Massachusetts to establish an ATM in that state.”57 In the same year, the
OCC also issued an interpretive letter that determined that a Florida law
that prohibited out-of-state banks from operating ATMs in the state
impermissibly interfered with the powers granted a national bank under the
National Bank Act.58 The decision was prompted by a request from a bank
without branches in either state that was considering placing deposit-taking
ATMs in those states.59 In the absence of these interventions, ATM
placements would likely have been much smaller in Massachusetts and
Florida.
In sum, the benefits to consumers created via these OCC letters—
which manifest themselves in the former of increased competition, lower
prices, and greater access to ATMs—must be considered carefully when
measuring the net benefits of ending preemption.
B.

Preemption reduces the price of credit while increasing its availability

Preemption has increased the availability of credit (and reduced its
price) by eliminating price controls and by promoting uniform national
markets.
1. Price controls
In addition to eliminating protectionist statutes, preemption has
53. Id. at 1-2.
54. Id. at 13.
55. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE DECISION #98-16 at 6,
(Mar. 4, 1998).
56. Id. at 1.
57. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERPRETIVE LETTER #939 at 1,
(Oct. 15, 2001).
58. Id. at 2.
59. Id. at 1.
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prevented states from effectively imposing price controls on banking
products. There is broad agreement among economists that price controls
have harmful economic consequences.60 As the late Nobel Laureate Milton
Friedman observed, both the shortage of housing in New York and the
gasoline shortages of the 1970s were caused by well-meaning legislation
that imposed price controls.61 Although these provisions often seem
beneficial to consumers in that they guarantee lower prices, economics
shows that price controls cause suppliers to reduce their output. The loss of
economic value to consumers that this reduction in output creates exceeds
any benefits that result from the lower prices, and thus, consumers are
worse off. Economists refer to these losses of output as “deadweight loss”
because of the economic value that is destroyed as a result of the dead
weight of the regulation. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the
OCC’s preemption decisions striking down state-enforced price controls
have increased economic welfare.
An analysis of discussions surrounding city-level restrictions on ATM
fees is edifying on this point. In 2002, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court ruling preempting municipal
ordinances in San Francisco and Santa Monica that prohibited banks from
charging ATM fees to non-depositors.62 The ordinances, which were
enacted in October and November of 1999 by Santa Monica and San
Francisco, respectively, were challenged by a group of banks and the
California Bankers Association.63 The banks ceased allowing nondepositors to use their ATMs while the law was in place,64 presumably
because restrictions on surcharges eliminated the economic incentive to
providing such services to non-customers. In essence, consumers were
denied access to valuable financial services because of lobbying by
parochial local concerns. Such “deadweight loss” destroyed the economic
value of providing ATM service to non-customers, resulting in an overall
loss of consumer benefits. While the Court of Appeals ruled the National
Bank Act and the regulations of OCC permit national banks to charge

60. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JERRY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
715 (Addison Wesley 4th ed. 2004) (“Regulation can reduce the efficiency of competitive
markets. In many cities around the world, government agencies regulate apartment rental
rates, using rent controls to keep rental rates below the competitive level. As a result, the
demand for housing exceeds the supply.”); MICHAEL L. KATZ & HARVEY S. ROSEN,
MICROECONOMICS 365-66 (McGraw-Hill 3d ed. 1998) (demonstrating that total economic
welfare (surplus) falls as a result of price controls).
61. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
219 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1990).
62. Bank of America, et al. v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F. 3d 551, 555-6
(9th Cir. 2002).
63. Id. at 556.
64. Id. at 557.
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ATM fees,65 it is instructive to note the significant impact a local
municipality’s action could have had on the provision of financial services
in a given area. The exponential negative impact that differing actions by
50 state legislatures, as permitted under the Administration’s proposals,
could have on our national marketplace is thus particularly worrisome.
Academic analysis of state ATM fee restrictions further supports the
case against local price regulation. Professor Gautaum Gowrisankaran and
John Krainer of the San Francisco Federal Reserve provide empirical
evidence that permitting surcharging increases access to ATMs.66 The
authors compared the behavior of ATM operators in Minnesota, where
surcharging has been allowed since 1996, to ATM operators in Iowa, which
upheld a surcharge ban until 2003.67 The authors find that the Iowa
surcharge ban reduced ATM entry by an average of approximately 12% in
the counties along the Minnesota border.68
Economic logic also suggests that the negative consequences of
restrictions on surcharging will fall primarily on smaller, interstate banks.
Surcharging affects mainly bank customers using out-of-network ATMs.
Faced with ATM surcharge restrictions, banks would most likely continue
to operate (smaller) ATM networks, but they would allow only customers
with accounts at the bank to use their ATMs. Consumers desiring quick,
reliable access to cash would then be forced to switch to larger banks to
insure uninterrupted access to ATM machines. Accordingly, state-level
regulation of ATM fees may paradoxically burden smaller banks - the very
banks that critics of preemption argue are essential to insure the health of
the banking system.
Basic economics demonstrates that price controls have the perverse
consequences of reducing output and actually increasing the final prices
paid by consumers. By lowering the price firms can charge for the
products they supply, price controls induce firms to reduce supply. As a
result of the shortage, consumers are either forced to pay exorbitant rates in
black markets or bid up the prices of substitutes.69 As the prominent
economist Dr. Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution explained in an
article on anti-predatory lending laws, although price controls are often
65. Id. at 558.
66. Gautuam Gowrisankaran & John Krainer, Bank ATMs and ATM Surcharges,
ECON.
LETTER
2005-36,
Dec.
16,
2005,
available
at
FRBSF
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2005/el2005-36.html. Until 1996, the
major ATM networks prohibited levying surcharges. From 1996 to 2001, five years after
the ban on surcharging was lifted, ATM deployment roughly tripled. The authors note that
“the regime change provided a kind of ‘before and after’ experiment commonly used to
examine the predictions of economic models.” Id. at 2.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 18 (Transaction Publishers 2007).
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instituted to protect consumers, as a rule, they end up harming the
consumers they were intended to protect.70
2.

National markets

The promotion of uniform, national markets has also increased the
availability of credit at reduced cost to millions of American consumers.
For example, preemption has helped ensure the efficient functioning of the
national market for securitized mortgages. Securitization is vital to
enhancing liquidity in the area of home loans, car loans, credit cards, and
commercial loans. As Leon Kendall and Michael Fishman explained in
their seminal book on securitization, securitization is “one of the most
important and abiding innovations to emerge in financial markets since the
1930s.”71
Kendall and Fishman list seven basic requirements of any successful
securitization: “(1) standardized contract[]; (2) grading of risk via
underwriting; (3) database of historic statistics; (4) standardization of
applicable laws; (5) standardization of servicer quality; (6) reliable supply
of quality credit enhancers; and (7) computers [to] handle complexity of
analysis.”72 Uniform regulations not only directly implicate their fourth
requirement, but they also permit securitizers to compile and analyze
historical data by region holding the regulations constant, which is also a
necessary condition for a successful securitization. Without uniform
lending rules, it is impossible for securitizers to measure the risk of a pool
of loans, which in turn, complicates the pricing of loans for the secondary
market. Without uniform standards, including standard laws, the sales
price would be prohibitive and the market would break down.
Moreover, disparate state laws in areas concerning what defines a
“finance charge” or what constitutes an “acceptable” interest rate further
undermine the ability to securitize the cash flows from mortgage loans.
The principal payment and the finance charge are two primary cash flows
in any securitization. If different jurisdictions define the finance charge
differently, needless complexity would be added to the process of
securitization. If some jurisdictions effectively prohibited securitization
through assignee liability or limitations or restrictions on the ability to sell
finance charge receivables, those jurisdictions would hamper local

70. Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risk of Premature State
Regulation of Predatory Lending, AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION (2003), available at
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/1FAE5B14-C034-4FF7-8566-9664F0BDEDEC/28934/
PredReport20093.pdf.
71. LEON KENDALL & MICHAEL FISHMAN, A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1 (MIT Press
1996).
72. Id. at 7 (Table 1) (emphasis added).
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economic performance at the expense of the Federal safety net for lending
institutions, just like the attempts by California to nullify the due-on-sale
clause referred to in earlier sections.
In the event of such disparate regulation, it would be nearly
impossible to convert cash flows from disparately-regulated loans into
standardized streams that could be securitized, resulting in significant
negative implications for the U.S. economy. According to Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Information, as of the second quarter 2009,
there were $307.5 billion in outstanding asset-backed securities (ABS) for
credit cards; $354.7 billion in outstanding ABS for home equity loans; and
$132.0 billion in outstanding ABS for automobile loans.73 Fannie Mae has
been able to obtain a large base of low-cost funding by aggregating
uniform loans that were originated throughout the United States. But
Fannie Mae cannot achieve the requisite scale without uniform national
rules.74
To be sure, there are structural problems in the mortgage market that
must be resolved. But because securitization plays such an important role
in increasing liquidity and lowering costs, it is essential that we perfect the
securitization process rather than restrict the efficient functioning of the
national mortgage market. Indeed, it has been noted in the media that with
the recent “credit crunch” consumers have been forced to take out loans at
extremely high rates of interest from loan sharks.75 As Dr. Litan observed,
state regulations that interfere with the functioning of credit markets often
interfere with the “democratization” of credit.76 In other words, interfering
with credit markets by inhibiting the development of national markets for
financial products like mortgages increases the prices and decreases the
availability of credit.
73. SIFMA,
Asset-Backed
Securities
Outstanding,
available
at
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/SIFMA_USABSOutstanding.pdf.
74. In response to amended version of The Georgia Fair Lending Act introduced on
March 7, 2003, Fannie Mae issued a statement explaining that it would not purchase any
loans classified as “high-cost home loans” under the Act. Fannie Mae, Announcement 0302, Purchase of Georgia and New York “High-Cost Home Loans” (Mar. 31, 2003) Freddie
Mac also announced that it would not purchase high-cost loans in Georgia. See Industry
Letter from Freddie Mac to All Freddie Mac Sellers and Servicers, Re: Revisions to Freddie
Mac's Mortgage Purchase Requirements Based on the Enactment of Section 6-L of the New
York State Banking Law and Amendments to the Georgia Fair Lending Act (Mar. 31,
2003),
available
at
www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Residential/2003/freddie_indyltr0331.pdf (discussing the
revisions of mortgage requirements in New York and Georgia due to the passing of
enactments 6-L of the New York State Banking Law and amendment to the Georgia Fair
Lending Act).
75. Alistair MacDonald & Jeanne Whalen, Loan Sharks Circle Credit-Starved
ST.
J.,
Sept.
1,
2009,
available
at
Consumers,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125175126871273709.html.
76. Litan, supra note 70, at 18.
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Preemption creates a uniform regulatory climate for multi-state
banks, allowing them to operate more efficiently

By allowing banks to operate under a uniform regulatory structure,
preemption increases the ability of national banks to operate efficiently
throughout the United States. However, one can only speculate, what
impact 50 different state laws on ATM fees, for example, would have on
the cost of banking services to everyday consumers, let alone the effect on
the national marketplace.
To prove empirical evidence of the negative impact that state actions
can have on economic efficiencies and consumer benefits, we looked back
to the lifting of state branching restrictions that occurred in the 1990s and
the economic ramifications of such actions. A review of the economic
literature on state regulation of banks reveals that reducing barriers to bank
expansion across state lines increases the banking services available to
consumers while lowering the price. To the extent that ending preemption
will impose higher regulatory costs on national banks operating in several
states, the economic literature suggests that both banks and consumers will
suffer.
Jith Jayaratane and Philip Strahan, former senior economists at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, analyzed the “impact of geographic
restrictions on the banking industry” by looking at states’ removal of
geographic limits on bank branching from 1978 to 1992.77 The authors
found that “bank efficiency improved greatly once branching restrictions
were lifted” and that “[l]oan losses and operating costs fell sharply and the
reduction in banks’ costs was largely passed along to bank borrowers in the
form of lower loan rates.”78 The authors found that benefits were not only
limited to bank customers; state economies also grew faster once branching
was allowed.79
Astrid Dick, former economist in the Research Group of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, examined the effects of the Riegle-Neal Act’s
deregulation of branching restrictions on market structure, service, and
performance.80 The author finds that “[a] significant portion of the observed
77. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Benefits of Branching Deregulation, 3
ECON.
POL’Y
REV.
13
(Dec.
1997),
available
at
FRBNY
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/97v03n4/9712jaya.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 14 (“While the improvements to the banking system following deregulation
helped bank customers directly, we also find important benefits to the rest of the economy.
In particular, state economies grew significantly faster once branching was allowed—in
part, we suggest, because deregulation permitted the expansion of those banks that were best
able to route savings to the most productive uses.”).
80. Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure,
Quality, and Bank Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 567 (2006).
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increase in branch networks can be traced to the deregulation, allowing
consumers to enjoy larger fee-free networks locally and regionally.”81 The
author also finds that banking spreads fall in the context of deregulation
while bank profit rates remain constant.82 These findings, in conjunction
with the research of Jayaratne and Strahan, bolster our thesis that
preemption increases the ability of national banks to operate more
efficiently, which redounds to the ultimate benefit of consumers and local
economies.
III. CASE STUDIES OF THE BENEFITS OF IMPOSING UNIFORM REGULATORY
STANDARDS IN OTHER U.S. INDUSTRIES
In evaluating the potential consequences of ending preemption for
national banks, it is useful to consider real-world examples from other U.S.
industries that have experienced a change in the uniformity of their
regulatory oversight. We offer case studies from the wine and telecom
industries, which demonstrate that eliminating state regulations that impair
competition leads to greater economic efficiency.
A.

The wine industry

Eight states, including Michigan and New York erected barriers to
out-of-state wineries directly shipping their goods ordered online or over
the phone to consumers without similar restrictions for in-state wineries. In
2005, the Supreme Court ruled that state alcohol laws may not discriminate
between in-state and out-of-state producers because the 21st Amendment
does not override the Commerce Clause.83
In 2003, lower court rulings forced Virginia to repeal a discriminatory
law similar to New York’s.84 This change allowed economists Professor
Alan Wiseman of Ohio State University and Professor Jerry Ellig of
George Mason University to evaluate the effects of removing interstate
trade barriers. The authors measured the price of the most popular wines
both in traditional brick-and-mortar stores and on Internet retailers’
websites before and after the court’s decision. In both periods, online
stores were cheaper and had a wider selection, though, before the decision,
81. Id.
82. Id. at 587-591.
83. Charles Lane, Justices Reject Curbs on Wine Sales; 5-4 Ruling a Victory for
Interstate Shippers, WASHINGTON POST, May 17, 2005, at A1 (reporting on Granholm v.
Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)).
84. Alan E. Wiseman & Jerry Ellig, Legislative Action, Market Reaction and Interstate
Commerce: Results of Virginia's Natural Experiment with Direct Wine Shipment, Mercatus
Center
(Dec.
15,
2005),
at
2-3,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=836364.
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Virginians could not take advantage of these web sites. After the state’s
discriminatory law was repealed and in-state distributors and retailers faced
out-of-state competition, wine prices at brick-and-mortar stores declined up
to 40% relative to prices offered by online retailers. The authors conclude
that the elimination of these regulations increased consumer welfare.
[N]ot just by facilitating entry by out-of-state sellers, but also by
placing competitive pressure on the in-state sellers. More
broadly speaking, this result clearly supports theories that predict
how government mandated market restrictions inhibit
competition and facilitate higher prices, and how the removals of
those bans will facilitate more efficient market outcomes.85
B.

Wireless telephony

A centralized commercial policy is especially important in industries
that are characterized by economies of scale—industries that can offer
consumers lower prices or higher quality products as firms grow larger
while earning the same or greater profit. The wireless telephony industry,
like many other industries facing economies of scale, favors larger firms.86
Consumers clearly place great value on the ability to access their carrier’s
network anywhere in the country. Thus, carriers with national networks
had a significant competitive advantage as they offered consumers a
superior product (free nationwide roaming). Before 1994, states and the
federal government had concurrent power to regulate the services that
wireless carriers offered to consumers; some states such as California and
New York imposed price controls on the nascent industry.87 However, in
1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) preempted the state
laws regulating wireless telephony. As in the wine example above, the
85. Id. at 29.
86. It bears noting that the banking industry is also characterized by significant
economies of scale. See Allen N. Berger, et al., Competition from Large, Multimarket
Firms and the Performance of Small, Single-Market Firms: Evidence from the Banking
Industry, 39 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 331, 332 (Mar.-Apr. 2007) (arguing that
technological advances “may have also allowed multimarket banks to offer higher quality
services to consumers—in the form of large branch and ATM networks, for instance—
thereby putting greater competitive pressure on smaller, less geographically diversified
banks.”); Gregory Elliehausen, Staff, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington DC, The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence, FRB STAFF
STUDY 171 (Apr. 1998), at 25-27 (discussing whether regulatory costs in the banking
industry exhibit economies of scale).
87. Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone
Regulation?, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 155, 157 (2003) (discussing the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000), which revoked states'
authority to “regulate the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or
any private mobile service.”).
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FCC created a “natural experiment” that economists were able to use to
evaluate the effects of a change in policy. Thomas Hazlett, currently a
Professor of Law and Economics at George Mason University, undertook a
comprehensive review of the literature concerning the effects of the FCC’s
preemption of state regulation.88 Professor Hazlett’s review demonstrates
that the change in regulatory oversight toward uniform, national standards
unquestionably increased economic efficiency. Before deregulation,
consumers in states that regulated wireless telephony, such as California
and New York, paid more. Furthermore, state regulations discouraged
rivals wireless providers from entering the market and slowed consumer
adoption of cellular phones. Just as balkanized state laws hindered the
growth of wireless networks and raised cellular prices for everyone,
balkanized state laws stymied the growth of ATM and branch networks,89
and thereby raise the cost of credit and banking services for consumers.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on our findings above, we offer two concrete policy
implications for financial regulators and policymakers. New regulations
are sorely needed to avoid repeating consumer harm that helped contribute
to the credit crisis, but myriad competing sets of new regulations will likely
create more economic harm than good.
A.

Elimination of preemption would generate significant social cost

Eliminating preemption for national banks is an inefficient way to
achieve the worthy objective of protecting consumers. A careful review of
the evidence indicates that preemption has been an important policy tool
for opening up markets and increasing competition, leading to benefits for
banks and their customers. Eliminating preemption would create a
complex regulatory environment where banks are forced to operate under a
patchwork of state regulations. At the very least, disparate standards would
impose significant compliance costs on banks seeking to operate across
state lines. The experience with Sarbanes-Oxley regulation has shown the
burden of such compliance costs would be most difficult for small to midsize banks operating in multiple states.90 As the wine and wireless
88. Id. at 205-221.
89. Berger, supra note 86, at 337 (“The literature suggests that consumers value dense
branch networks, both locally and over larger geographic areas.”).
90. Sarbanes-Oxley imposed significant auditing requirements on publicly traded
companies. The GAO, among other sources, has found that such regulation is particularly
burdensome for small companies. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: Consideration of Key Principles Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller
Public Companies, Report to S. Comm. on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, GAO-06-
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examples show, a sufficiently complex thicket of varying regulations could
undermine banks incentives to operate across state lines. Under this
scenario, banking customers would undoubtedly face higher prices as
banks would no longer enjoy the cost-efficiencies associated with
economies of scale.
Furthermore, many state regulations that have ostensibly been passed
to protect consumers have in reality been protectionist measures that favor
entrenched local political interests at the expense of consumers. State
regulations are more likely than federal regulations to turn protectionist or
otherwise be economically inefficient because a state regulator does not
internalize the costs that protectionist measures impose on banks that
operate both inside and outside of that state; nor does that regulator
internalize the costs that such measures impose on the customers of those
same banks who reside outside of the state. For example, a bank’s inflated
costs associated with conforming to myriad state rules or being denied
certain economies of scale as a result of entry restrictions will not fully
redound to the harm of residents within the state that issues a protectionist
measure; those costs are spread throughout the banking system. Although
a state regulator should, in theory, internalize the cost of bank customers
inside of the state, in practice, state regulators can become unduly
influenced by local interests that seek to protect their business from
competition to the detriment of banking customers.
Historical state-level prohibitions against branching and other forms
of entry—which were subsequently reversed by preemptive Federal
legislation—were clearly motivated by protectionist concerns. For these
reasons, a national regulator of banks engaging in multi-state activities
plays a crucially important role in the banking industry. Because the
national regulator can internalize the positive spillover effects associated
with greater competition and enhanced economies of scope and scale, and
because the national regulator is less influenced by local business interests,
the scope and extent of banking regulation will look very different than that
chosen by fifty disparate state regulators. Hence, without preemption there
would be no federal check on state regulators and legislatures who have
been “captured” by local interests like insurance companies, and costly
protectionist measures would undoubtedly proliferate.
B.

Creation of new federal rules for problem areas

The economic evidence also demonstrates that preemption is not
responsible for the consumer-protection failures associated with predatory
lending and the subprime crisis. Our analysis indicates that the vast

361 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06361.pdf.
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majority of subprime loans were originated by lenders outside of the
banking system’s regulatory apparatus. This fact does not mean that there
is no need for increased consumer-protection measures—the rash of
abusive lending practices that have come to light certainly require a
concerted regulatory response. It bears noting that preemption is not the
same as non-regulation. Preemption has been used to open markets and to
simplify regulatory compliance, but it does not free banks from federal
regulation, or even state-level regulations that do not conflict with federal
law. Furthermore, predatory lending is not restricted to a few specific
regional locales, but rather is a national problem. Thus, the optimal public
policy solution is uniform regulation at the federal level, which could
largely come from existing federal regulators.
In summary, to address the gaps that were painfully exposed by the
2008-09 financial crisis, new federal regulations are likely needed. But
those potentially more stringent regulations should be uniformly imposed
across the nation, so that banks and their customers can continue to reap the
benefits of common regulatory standards.
CONCLUSION
Critics of preemption have focused on the straw-man issue of the
subprime mortgage crisis while ignoring the empirical evidence that
preemption has increased economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
When considered from an economic perspective, consumer protection and
preemption are not contrary policies, but rather are different means of
ensuring that financial markets function to maximize the value of the
banking services available to consumers. When markets are competitive,
increasing the operating cost of firms through a patchwork of state
regulation will result in higher prices for consumers. Likewise, protecting
high-cost firms in a given state from competition against more efficient
(out-of-state) firms will result in higher prices for consumers. These
conclusions are supported by a wide body of economic research and
empirical analysis. Indeed, our discussion probably understates the
benefits of preemption policy because it is likely that many ill-advised state
regulations were deterred by the fact that state legislators and regulators
were aware that unduly burdensome state laws would be preempted.
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that we do not oppose increased
financial regulation to protect consumers. Indeed, it is clear that in certain
instances mortgage lenders took advantage of ill-informed consumers in the
interest of making short-term profits. However, protecting consumers does
not require policymakers to eviscerate the framework of Federal banking
regulation that has provided a substantial basis for banking industry
stability and economic growth since 1863. Indeed, it would be counter-
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productive to revise those aspects of banking regulation that currently
benefit consumers under the guise of “consumer protection.” Preemption
may be the status-quo, but this does not implicate it as a cause of the
financial crisis or as bad public policy. Rather, the evidence indicates that
preemption has increased the efficiency and quality of our banking system
over time, and should remain a cornerstone of bank policy.

